

# Verification of programs by abstract interpretation

Marc Chevalier

May 28, 2019

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

Past and future

What? Why?

What is abstract interpretation?  
Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

Past and future

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

Past and future

# What is abstract interpretation?

A way to prove properties on programs

- ▶ No undefined behavior
- ▶ Some specification on output is matched
- ▶ Maximum execution time, constant execution path
- ▶ ... any other semantic property you can think of.

What? Why?

What is abstract interpretation?

Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

Past and future

# Why? – What happen when software fail



Figure 1: Ariane V, 4th June 1996

# Why? – What happen when software fail



Figure 2: Ariane V, 40s later

# Why? – Cost of software failure

Bugs have various annoying consequences:

- ▶ Deaths (Patriot MIM-104, Toyota, radiotherapy machines)
- ▶ A lot of money: Ariane V (payload:  $\$370 \cdot 10^6$ ),  $\$60 \cdot 10^9$ /year in the US (NIST)
- ▶ Privacy (Heartbleed)
- ▶ ...

# Why? – What we usually do

How developers think they can avoid bugs:

- ▶ Tests
- ▶ High level/safe language
- ▶ Strict code style

Still, Ariane V crashed. . . . "And here, poor fool[s], with all [their] lore, [they] stand no wiser than before".



# Verification of programs by abstract interpretation

Marc Chevalier

What? Why?

**Ok, but how?**

The idea

An example

Let's generalize

In everyday life

The incompleteness

In completeness in everyday life

Other domains

Building an analyzer

Past and future

What? Why?

**Ok, but how?**

Building an analyzer

Past and future

# The idea

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

**The idea**

An example

Let's generalize

In everyday life

The incompleteness

In completeness in everyday life

Other domains

Building an analyzer

Past and future

- ▶ Check an execution: test, limited.
- ▶ Check all executions at once: ok, but not computable.
- ▶ Compute an over-approximation of all executions: sound, not complete.

Every possible behavior will be in our approximation (but maybe more).

# An example

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

The idea

**An example**

Let's generalize

In everyday life

The incompleteness

In completeness in everyday life

Other domains

Building an analyzer

Past and future

```
1  int f(int x)
2  {                               //  $x \in [-2^{31}; 2^{31} - 1]$ 
3      y = abs(x);                //  $y \in [0; 2^{31} - 1] \vee x = -2^{31}$ 
4      z = y + 1;                 //  $z \in [1; 2^{31} - 1] \vee y = 2^{31} - 1$ 
5      return 1/z;                //  $0 \notin [1; 2^{31} - 1] \Rightarrow OK !$ 
6  }
```

## Let's generalize

$(D, \subseteq)$  a too big set (with good properties): typically, set of memory environments.

$$\llbracket P \rrbracket = f_1 \circ \dots \circ f_n$$

We want that  $c \subseteq \textit{specification}$  holds at every program point.

# Let's generalize

Abstract domain:

- ▶  $(D^\sharp, \subseteq^\sharp)$ : a reasonable set (eg.  $\overline{\mathbb{Z}^2}$ )
- ▶  $\gamma : D^\sharp \rightarrow D$ : concretization (eg.  $(a, b) \mapsto \{x \in \mathbb{Z} \mid a \leq x \leq b\}$ )

Sound if for all program point,  $c \subseteq \gamma(a)$ : we don't miss any behavior by executing in the abstract (but we lose precision).

Sound abstract operator:  $f_i \circ \gamma \subseteq \gamma \circ f_i^\sharp$ .

And we want  $\gamma(a) \subseteq \textit{specification}$ .

# Let's generalize

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

The idea

An example

**Let's generalize**

In everyday life

The incompleteness

In completeness in everyday life

Other domains

Building an analyzer

Past and future

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
 & \llbracket \times 2 \rrbracket \circ \gamma & \\
 & & \left| \begin{array}{ccc}
 & & \gamma \circ \llbracket \times 2 \rrbracket^\# \\
 & & \\
 [-1; 1] & \xrightarrow{(\times 2)^\#} & [-2; 2] \\
 & & \downarrow \gamma \\
 & & \{-2, -1, 0, 1, 2\}
 \end{array}
 \\
 \begin{array}{ccc}
 [-1; 1] \\
 \gamma \downarrow \\
 \{-1, 0, 1\} \xrightarrow{\times 2} \{-2, 0, 2\}
 \end{array}
 & & 
 \end{array}$$

We have every possible result by executing in the abstract.

# In everyday life

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

The idea

An example

Let's generalize

**In everyday life**

The incompleteness

In completeness in everyday life

Other domains

Building an analyzer

Past and future

Every way to infer some property about a system without knowing everything:

- ▶ Rule of signs for multiplication:

$\times$	$+$	$-$
$+$	$+$	$-$
$-$	$-$	$+$

- ▶ Vote counting

# The incompleteness

```

1  /*@ requires -10 <= x <= 10; */
2  int g(int x)
3  {                                // x ∈ [-10, 10]
4      int y = x;                    // y ∈ [-10, 10]
5      int z = x * y;
6      /* z ∈ Interval({a × b | a ∈ [-10, 10], b ∈ [-10, 10]})
7      z ∈ [-100, 100]
8      */
9      int t = z + 1; // t ∈ [-99, 101]
10     return 1/t;    // 0 ∈ [-99, 101] ⇒ Alarm!
11 }

```

But this program is clearly safe.

What happens? This abstract domain cannot understand the relation between  $x$  and  $y$ .



# In completeness in everyday life

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

The idea

An example

Let's generalize

In everyday life

The incompleteness

**In completeness in everyday life**

Other domains

Building an analyzer

Past and future

Sometimes our partial knowledge is not enough:

- ▶ Rule of signs for addition:

+	+	-
+	+	?
-	?	-
- ▶ Vote counting without absolute majority

## Other domains

- ▶ Numerical:

Non relational:

- ▶ Modulo:  $x_i \equiv c_i [n_i]$
- ▶ Bitwise:  $x_i = 0?1??100010111????$
- ▶ Sign:  $x_i < 0$ ,  $x_i > 0$ ,  $x_i \leq 0 \dots$

Relational:

- ▶ Polytope:  $\sum a_i x_i \leq c_i$
- ▶ Octagon:  $\pm x_i \pm x_j \leq c_i$

And combination of domains.

- ▶ Memory: some value points to another, memory structures, separation logic. . . .
- ▶ Partitioning:  $(x > 0 \Rightarrow \dots) \wedge (x \leq 0 \Rightarrow \dots)$
- ▶ All ad hoc domain you need.

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

**Building an analyzer**

The problem of loops

The solution: the widening

Interval widening

Discussion

Past and future

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

Past and future

# The problem of loops – 1<sup>st</sup> iteration

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

## The problem of loops

The solution: the widening

Interval widening

Discussion

Past and future

```
1  int i = 0;           // i ∈ [0, 0]
2  while(i < 1000) {   // i ∈ [0, 0]
3      i = i + 1;      // i ∈ [1, 1]
4  }
```

# The problem of loops – 2<sup>nd</sup> iteration

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

## The problem of loops

The solution: the widening

Interval widening

Discussion

Past and future

```
1  int i = 0;           // i ∈ [0, 0]
2  while(i < 1000) {   // i ∈ [0, 0] ∪# [1, 1] = [0, 1]
3      i = i + 1;      // i ∈ [1, 2]
4  }
```

# The problem of loops – 3<sup>rd</sup> iteration

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

## The problem of loops

The solution: the widening

Interval widening

Discussion

Past and future

```
1  int i = 0;           // i ∈ [0, 0]
2  while(i < 1000) {   // i ∈ [0, 1] ∪# [1, 2] = [0, 2]
3      i = i + 1;      // i ∈ [1, 3]
4  }
```

## The problem of loops – 1000<sup>th</sup> iteration

```
1  int i = 0;           // i ∈ [0, 0]
2  while(i < 1000) {   // i ∈ [0, 999]
3      i = i + 1;      // i ∈ [1, 1000] = [1, 999] ∪# [1000, 1000]
4  }
```

Urgh! So long!

And what if a loop is really long? Or does not terminate?

# The solution: the widening

Instead of using the abstract union ( $\cup^\sharp$ ), we use a widening ( $\nabla$ ).

- ▶ sound:  $\forall (a, b) \in D^\sharp{}^2, \gamma(a) \cup \gamma(b) \subseteq \gamma(a \nabla b)$
- ▶ termination: for all  $top_0 \in D^\sharp$  and  $f^\sharp : D^\sharp \rightarrow D^\sharp$ , the sequence

$$top_{n+1} = top_n \nabla f^\sharp(top_n)$$

is stationary.



# Interval widening

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

The problem of loops

The solution: the widening

**Interval widening**

Discussion

Past and future

Drop unstable constrains:

$$[a, b] \nabla [c, d] = \left[ \begin{array}{l} \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} a & \text{if } a \leq c \\ -\infty & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right\}, \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} b & \text{if } b \geq d \\ +\infty & \text{otherwise} \end{array} \right\} \end{array} \right]$$

# Interval widening – 1<sup>st</sup> iteration

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

The problem of loops

The solution: the widening

**Interval widening**

Discussion

Past and future

```
1  int i = 0;
2  while(i < 1000) { // i ∈ [0, 0]
3      i = i + 1;    // i ∈ [1, 1]
4  }
```

# Interval widening – 2<sup>nd</sup> iteration

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

The problem of loops

The solution: the widening

**Interval widening**

Discussion

Past and future

```
1  int i = 0;
2  while(i < 1000) { //  $i \in [0, 0] \nabla [1, 1] = [0, +\infty]$ 
3      i = i + 1;    //  $i \in [1, +\infty] = [1, 999] \cup^\# [1000, +\infty]$ 
4  }
```

# Discussion

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

The problem of loops

The solution: the widening

Interval widening

**Discussion**

Past and future

We can add thresholds (e.g. constants  $\pm 1$ ). No widening at some iteration. . . .

Trade-off: convergence speed vs. precision.

We can still refine the invariant a posteriori.

Verification of  
programs by abstract  
interpretation

Marc Chevalier

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

Past and future

Abstract interpretation vs. the  
world

My work

What? Why?

Ok, but how?

Building an analyzer

Past and future

# Abstract interpretation vs. the world

## Good things:

- ▶ Works on existing code
- ▶ It really works: Astrée (A340, A380)
- ▶ Quite automatic (when you have the suited domains)
- ▶ The developer who knows its code can help the analyzer easily

## Bad things:

- ▶ Incompleteness
- ▶ A lot of work if existing domains are not powerful enough
- ▶ Some properties are very difficult to prove with this method

# My work

Study case: the OS of an host platform in planes at the border between trusted (flight control) and untrusted (potentially hostile) world.

We want to prove some security properties: memory isolation, hosted applications don't get more privileges. . . .

Properties are not visible from C (about CPU state, mainly): inline assembly  $\Rightarrow$  analyze assembly. Impacts everything.